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NOTE
The Antidotes to the Double Standard:
Protecting the Healthcare Rights of Mentally Ill




This Note is an examination of mentally ill inmates' constitutional right to
treatment. It has significant doctrinal and practical implications. In terms of
doctrine, the Supreme Court has created distinct standards for the minimum
levels of care for inmates (Estelle) and the civilly committed mentally ill
(Youngberg). Under this framework mentally ill inmates are constitutionally
equivalent to inmates generally, but are entitled to less care than the civilly
committed even if they suffer the same illness. This Note explores this gap
through the lens of equal protection and argues that mentally ill inmates are
similarly situated to the civilly committed. It further contends that inmates
constitute a "discrete and insular minority" and thus the standard establishing
their right to care should be subject to strict scrutiny. This Note finds that Estelle
fails this test.
Practically, this Note brings visibility to a consequential area of the law
neglected by scholarship. Over half of inmates are mentally ill and yet treatment
in prisons is inadequate. The literature at the intersection of health, criminal
justice, and constitutional rights has not constructively considered how doctrine
should be changed to protect the wellbeing of this vulnerable population.
Scholars have also provided little oversight of the judicial administration of
justice in this field; there are few reviews of how judges actually apply treatment
rights standards. This Note lessens this blind spot by exposing how courts fail to
properly distinguish between different standards.
This Note proposes that the most promising antidote to the Estelle-
* J.D., Yale Law School, 2015; M.P.A., Columbia University, 2008. This Note is
dedicated to Professor Robert Burt: his inspiration, support, and friendship are sorely missed.
Many thanks also to Devon Porter for her insights, to the Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law
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Youngberg double standard, counterintuitively, is not the creation of a uniform
standard. A standard that puts mentally ill inmates on equal footing with the
civilly committed would solve the doctrinal puzzle, but would be subject to
Youngberg's inherent flaws and the judicial malpractice in this area. Recognizing
the deficiencies of a purely judicial remedy, this Note recommends a solution
relying both on courts and Congress. It concludes by highlighting the importance
of targeting the primary causes of society's neglect of mentally ill inmates-the
stigmatization of mental illness and incarceration-as a necessary step in
spurring these institutions to action. Vindication of mentally ill inmates' right to
treatment requires that society first overcome its prejudice against this vulnerable
population.
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INTRODUCTION
A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate
medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place
in civilized society.
-U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy1
A few decades ago, two individuals under state custody turned to the justice
system to substantiate their rights to healthcare. Their respective claims climbed
all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States, where each story
prompted judicial recognition of a constitutional right to treatment. In many
respects, these individuals' cases were mirror images. Both individuals had been
involuntarily committed to state custody because of socially undesirable
behavior. While in custody, each was at the mercy of the state for healthcare and
their claims were based on the state's failure to provide basic care. While
confined, each suffered illness and injury. Instead of providing treatment, the
state moved these two ailing individuals into isolation.
Both repeatedly sought redress within their institutions of confinement
before seeking justice in the court system. They turned to the courts asserting
rights to additional and alternative forms of treatment, grounding their claims in
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The
Court implicitly recognized a dimension of equality between these two
individuals' constitutional rights by using the same concept to define their right
to treatment-adequacy.2 It based this finding on the fact that confinement had
put both individuals at the institutions' mercy for basic care.3
Despite the parallelism between the two individuals' claims and the Court's
recognition of an element of equality, the Court ultimately fixated on what it
considered to be an essential difference: One individual's confinement was based
on criminal conviction; the other was civilly committed. Gamble, the criminal,
I Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
2 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) ("[R]espondent is entitled to
minimally adequate training.") (emphasis added); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976)
("[A] claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment [can] state[] a
violation of the Eighth Amendment.") (emphasis added).
3 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320 n.27 ("[T]he purpose of respondent's commitment
was to provide reasonable care and safety, conditions not available to him outside of an
institution."); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 ("[I]t is but just that the public be required to care for
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sought care for a back injury he suffered while working on a prison plantation.4
He received pain medication without a full assessment or treatment, and was
placed in solitary confinement.5 He asked the Court to protect his right to basic
care. Romeo, the civilly committed individual, was thirty-three but purportedly
had the capacity of an eighteen-month-old child. His mother's claim on his
behalf demanded habilitation and freedom from shackling.
6
The Court held that the different purposes of Gamble and Romeo's
confinements dictate unequal treatment standards, with inmates entitled to less
care than the civilly committed because the purpose of their confinement is
punishment.7 This finding resulted in the two constitutional standards that courts
use today. Inmates' rights are assessed under the minimalist Estelle standard
developed in Gamble's case and the civilly committed are protected by the more
robust Youngberg standard from Romeo's case.
In building this constitutional divide, the Court in effect shaped healthcare
into a penal weapon; its limitation is a valid form of punishment.8 This Note
rejects this premise, arguing that "denial of medical care is surely not part of the
punishment which civilized nations may impose for crime."9 It focuses on this
double standard's implications of for mentally ill inmates. Under the current
constitutional regime, mentally ill inmates are entitled to less care'( than the
civilly committed even if they suffer the same symptomology. To illustrate the
practical ramifications of this gap, Part I of this Note provides an overview of the
current crisis in inmate mental health. Part II examines the legal framework
underlying this discrepancy by analyzing the Estelle and Youngberg standards in
juxtaposition.
4 This Note uses the term "prison" as shorthand for all institutions of criminal
confinement, including jails.
5 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 109 ("Gamble was placed in solitary confinement for prolonged
periods as punishment for refusing to perform assigned work which he was physically unable
to perform.").
6 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309.
7 Id. at 321-22 ("Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more
considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of
confinement are designed to punish.").
8 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 ("[I]nadvertent failure to provide adequate medical
care cannot be said to constitute 'an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' or to be
'repugnant to the conscience of mankind."').
9 Id. at 116 n. 13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10 The two constitutional standards under discussion in this Note apply to mental and
physical healthcare. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22 (noting that the civilly committed are
entitled to at least as much care as inmates, which under Estelle includes physical and mental
health treatment); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (finding that under
Estelle there is "no underlying distinction between the right to medical care for physical ills
and its psychological or psychiatric counterpart").
5
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Part III is the crux of this Note. It undertakes an equal protection review of
Estelle relative to Youngberg and finds that Estelle fails this test. Parts IV and V
take this Note's equal protection review conclusion in a counterintuitive direction
by arguing against a uniform standard on par with Youngberg. Specifically, Part
IV raises doubts about the potential of a judicial solution by discussing trends of
judicial malpractice in the application of Youngberg. Part V reveals further
serious weaknesses in the Youngberg standard, in theory and in application, that
counsel against its use for inmates. In Part VI, this Note responds to the
deficiencies of a purely judicial remedy by proposing a solution that relies on
both the courts and Congress.
This project's scope is limited in two notable ways. First, this Note does
not discuss the implications of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) on
inmates' ability to bring suits related to mental health. The PLRA bars lawsuits
by inmates for monetary damages for mental injury unless physical harm is
present." This impediment to litigation is outside this Note's focus on judicial
doctrine and extra-judicial remedy. Second, this Note does not investigate the
weight that costs might have in the constitutional balance. Scholars have debated
what effect, if any, prison resource limitations should have on application of
Estelle without reaching a consensus; this Note only touches on this debate
tangentially.12 Full engagement in this strain of controversy would lead this Note
astray from its equality inquiry because prisons' 3 and civil institutions 4 are both
11 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803, 110 Stat. 1321,
1321-72 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2012) (prior to 2013
amendment)).
12 Compare Marc J. Posner, The Estelle Medical Professional Judgment Standard. The
Right of Those in State Custody To Receive High-Cost Medical Treatments, 18 AM. J.L. &
MED. 347, 353 (1992) ("[C]ost concerns cannot be considered in deten-nining prisoners'
medical care rights."), with Carrie S. Frank, Must Inmates Be Provided Free Organ
Transplants?: Revisiting the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J.
341, 356 (2005) ("[T]here appears to remain a fair amount of confusion as to whether cost can
ever be a legitimate consideration that precludes a finding of deliberate indifference."), and
Barbara Kritchevsky, Is There a Cost Defense? Budgetary Constraints as a Defense in Civil
Rights Litigation, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 483, 497 (2004) ("Constitutional standards that incorporate
a subjective state-of-mind analysis [including Estelle] allow budgetary limitations to enter the
analysis.").
13 See, e.g., NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON
POPULATION BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 10 (2014)
(explaining that the federal prison system is struggling with "the increasing cost" of its
operations).
14 Nicole Fisher, Mental Health Loses Funding As Government Continues Shutdown,
FORBES (Oct. 10, 2013, 12:06 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2013/1 0/1 0/mental-health-loses-funding-as-
government-continues-shutdown ("[A]s federal and state governments look to cut budgets at
every turn, mental and behavioral health services are often on the chopping block first.
16:1 (2016)
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cash-strapped and these severe resource limitations call for an inquiry all its own.
I. BACKGROUND: THE CRISIS IN INMATE MENTAL HEALTHCARE
In the decades since the Court drew a constitutional line between healthcare
in prisons and civil institutions, the Gambles of the world have started to look
even more like Romeos. Not only are both dependent on the state for care; the
care they need is nearly equivalent. The deinstitutionalization movement in the
1970s resulted in widespread closure of civil commitment institutions and an
influx of mentally ill individuals into the criminal justice system.15 Today,
prisons are de facto mental hospitals.1 6 They confine an estimated 1,264,300
mentally ill individuals,17 356,268 of whom suffer from severe mental illness.18
This is ten times more than hospitals house.'
9
Mentally ill inmates now out-number their non-ill counterparts-over half of
inmates are mentally ill. 20 Evidence suggests they suffer primarily from one of
two illnesses: major depression and anxiety disorder.21 Inmates are also reported
to have high rates of bipolar disorder (36.3%), severe depression (22.5%), and
22
psychosis or schizophrenia (18.6%).
Despite these serious conditions, mentally ill inmates are routinely deprived
of care.23 At least forty percent of this population receives no form of treatment
Financial cuts ... mean that those who need services most are often those left without proper
care.").
15 Danielle Drissel, Massachusetts Prison Mental Health Services: History, Policy and
Recommendations, 87 MASS. L. REV 106, 106 (2003).
16 E.g., Ralph Slovenko, The Transinstitutionalization ofthe Mentally Ill, 29 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 641, 657 (2003) ("[J]ails and prisons have become the new mental hospitals.").
17 Doris J. James & Lauren E. Glaze, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail
Inmates, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE 1 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
18 The Treatment of Persons with Mental Illness in Prisons and Jails: A State Survey,
TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. & NAT'L SHERIFFS' ASS'N 6 (2014) [hereinafter TREATMENT
ADVOCACY CTR., State Survey], http://tacreports.org/storage/documents/treatment-behind-
bars/treatment-behind-bars.pdf.
19 Id.
20 James & Glaze, supra note 17, at 3.
21 The Health Status of Soon- To-Be-Released Inmates: A Report to Congress, NAT'L
COMM'N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE 24 tbl.3-3 (2002),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/189735.pdf.
22 Eladio D. Castillo & Leanne F. Alarid, Factors Associated with Recidivism Among
Offenders with Mental Illness, 55 INT'L L.J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 98,
105 (2011).
23 See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 144 (D. Colo. 1979), aff'd in part, set
aside in part, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980) ("Mental health needs are shunned and ignored as
if they were an ugly stepchild of corrections.") (citation omitted).
7
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to address their mental health needs while incarcerated.24 This lack of treatment
often leads to decompensation,25 one consequence of which is increasing
difficulty complying with prison rules. This, in turn, contributes to mentally ill
inmates' high placement rates in solitary confinement, which further bleakens
their prognosis.26 Multiple interrelated failings in the prison system set the stage
for this human tragedy, including severe understaffing of mental health
professionals, limited efforts to identify and monitor the mentally ill, and
overreliance on medication to temporarily dull symptoms.
27
Scholars have spoken out against this injustice. Some have provided
nuanced critiques of Estelle2 8 and a lesser number have looked beyond the bench,
emphasizing the importance of the politics that surround application of Estelle.
29
One work on Estelle turns to Youngberg as a potential remedy in recognition of
the similarities between Gamble and Romeo, but does not underpin its proposal
with legal argument.30 It also does not focus on mental health. The literature on
Youngberg leaves the prison context virtually untouched, perhaps because in
24 Paula M. Ditton, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Mental Health and Treatment of
Inmates and Probationers, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 9 (1999),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf.
25 TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. State Survey, supra note 18, at 15. Decompensation is
defined as "loss of physiological compensation or psychological balance." Decompensation,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/medlineplus/decompensation.
26 Human Rights at Home: Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons and Jails: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Rights & the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1
(2009) [hereinafter Human Rights at Home] (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin, Chairman).
27 Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness, HUM. RTS. WATCH 4
(2003) [hereinafter Ill-Equipped], http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa 1003.pdf.
28 See, e.g., Michael Cameron Friedman, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the
Provision of Prison Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45
VAND. L. REV. 921, 946 (1992) (arguing that Estelle is "an inappropriate measure of the
constitutionality of prison health care provision" in part because of its subjective intent
requirement); Philip M. Genty, Confusing Punishment with Custodial Care: The Troublesome
Legacy of Estelle v. Gamble, 21 VT. L. REv. 379, 380-81 (1996) (claiming that the use of a
subjective standard is misguided because asking courts to consider only prisons' intent creates
a safe harbor when the impact of unintentional actions is egregious).
29 See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts,
and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 169 (2013) (explaining that the article
"lighten[s] scholarly emphasis on judges in favor of closer examination of the multi-player
politics"); Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1999 (1999) (faulting an Estelle article for its exclusive
concern with "the judiciary, and even more narrowly, the judicial activity of doctrine
creation"); see also Fred Cohen, The Limits of Judicial Reform of Prisons: What Works; What
Does Not, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 421, 465 (2004) ("Ultimately, overall community sentiment and
penal philosophy will dictate the larger picture and litigation will, in effect, keep the
place clean.").
30 Posner, supra note 12, at 355.
16:1 (2016)
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crafting Youngberg the Court barred its application to inmates.3' This Note fills
this gap in the literature by directly analyzing the disparity between Gamble and
Romeo's legal rights.
II. THE DOUBLE STANDARD: ESTELLE'S INFERIORITY TO YOUNGBERG
A. Gamble's Estelle
The Court's adjudication of Gamble's case in Estelle v. Gamble established
inmates' constitutional right to healthcare.32 It defined this right indirectly, by
interdicting "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs ... that can offend
'evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment.,33 Post-
Estelle courts have added texture by dividing the standard into objective and
subjective elements.34 The objective prong requires that "the deprivation [is]
sufficiently serious,"35 limiting the type of harm that qualifies. One court, for
instance, found that the interruption of HIV medication was not "serious"
37because the delay did not result in injury. Courts agree that mental illness is a
serious condition that warrants constitutional protection.
38
31 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982) ("Persons who have been
involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of
confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.").
32 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) ("[I]t was not until 1976, in Estelle v.
Gamble . . . that this Court first [applied the Eighth Amendment to prison deprivations].")
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
33 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (emphasis added).
34 See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 296, 298 (1991); Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192,
174 (2d Cir. 1987); Toombs v. Bell, 798 F.2d 297, 298 (8th Cir. 1986); Bowring v. Godwin,
551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977).
35 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added).
36 Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[N]ot every lapse in prison
medical care will rise to the level of a constitutional violation.") (citations omitted); Capps v.
Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894, 901 (D. Or. 1982) ("To the extent prison conditions are restrictive
and even harsh, they are part of the penalty criminals must pay for their offenses against
society.") (citations omitted).
37 Smith, 316 F.3d at 188 ("Although [the inmate] suffered from an admittedly serious
underlying condition, he presented no evidence that the two alleged episodes of missed
medication resulted in permanent or on-going harm to his health."); see Board v. Farnham,
394 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[W]e hold [that the inmate] had an established
constitutional right to toothpaste .... ").
38 See, e.g., Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[P]sychiatric needs
can constitute serious medical needs."); Seifullah v. Toombs, 940 F.2d 662, 662 (6th Cir.
1991) ("The eighth amendment requirement of adequate medical care for a prisoner applies
equally to psychiatric care."); Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991) ("This
circuit has recognized that deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious mental health needs
violates the eighth amendment."); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983)
9
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The subjective component shifts the inquiry to mens rea. The Estelle Court
specifies that mere "accident[al]",39 behavior does not qualify and subsequent
courts have maintained the ineligibility of unintentional harm.40 They situate
blameworthiness "somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and
purpose or knowledge at the other.' In effect, they equate it with recklessness.
B. Attacking Estelle
1. Impermissibly Vague
Courts have directed strong salvos at Estelle's basis in the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment." Judges have
accused the Estelle Court of inadequately explaining, and perhaps considering,
why the Eighth Amendment should apply to inmates' health rights; the relevance
of punishment to healthcare is not self-evident.43 This lack of rationale, in
conjunction with the vagueness of the Eighth Amendment itself, have left courts
feeling unmoored in their implementations of Estelle.44
("Treatment of the mental disorders of mentally disturbed inmates is a 'serious medical
need."') (citation omitted); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982)
("[Deliberate indifference] requirements apply to ... mental health."); Ramos v. Lamm, 639
F.2d 559, 574 (10th Cir. 1980) ("[The Constitution requires] treatment for inmates' . . .
psychological or psychiatric [needs]."); Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Peirce, 612 F.2d
754, 763 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[T]he 'deliberate indifference' standard of Estelle v. Gamble is
applicable in evaluating the constitutional adequacy of psychological or psychiatric care
provided at a jail or prison."); Bowring, 551 F.2d at 47-48.
39 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) ("An accident, although it may produce
added anguish, is not on that basis alone to be characterized as wanton infliction of
unnecessary pain.").
40 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) ("[D]eliberate indifference
describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence."); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 319 (1986) ("It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that
characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.").
41 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836.
42 See, e.g., id. at 838 ("[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he
should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases
be condemned as the infliction of punishment."); LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535
(11th Cir. 1993) ("To be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must knowingly or
recklessly disregard an inmate's basic needs so that knowledge can be inferred.").
43 See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) ("In essence, however, this
extension of the Eighth Amendment to prison conditions rested on little more than an ipse
dixit.").
44 See, e.g., Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258, 1264 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Because the eighth
amendment draws its meaning from the evolving standards of decency in a maturing society,
there is no fixed standard to determine whether conditions are cruel and unusual.") (citations
16:1 (2016)
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The objective prong aggravates Estelle's vagueness.45 Post-Estelle courts
have specified that a serious need "is one that has been diagnosed by a physician
as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention,,46 but this elaboration is of
little avail. Inmates have limited access to physicians-the Iowa prison system,
for instance, houses 2000 mentally ill inmates and has three psychiatrists.47 The
deference to lay persons is also problematic. Prison staff receive little to no
mental health training and are ill-equipped to recognize what warrants
treatment.48 Arguably, only exceedingly severe conditions will be detected and
covered by Estelle.49 This leaves a lot of suffering unprotected.
In struggling to define the objective prong in the context of the grim realities
of prison healthcare, some courts have turned it into a balancing test.50 They
weigh cost against medical severity. In contrast, some scholars argue that
medical need is dispositive; situational factors, however relevant to treatment
feasibility, do not belong in the constitutional inquiry.5' The divergence between
these approaches, with courts and scholars on both sides,52 is further evidence of
the Estelle standard's inadequacy. In permitting such disparate interpretations,
Estelle creates room for inconsistent outcomes.53
2. Elusive Intent
Estelle's subjective component creates an unreasonably high evidentiary
omitted); Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp. 522, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[T]his standard is
not one that can be applied with geometric precision."); see also Frank, supra note 12, at 346.
("[T]he Estelle opinion offers only limited guidance as to what types of conduct constitute
deliberate indifference.").
45 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see also Frank, supra note 12, at 347
("In Estelle, the Supreme Court provided little guidance to define what constitutes a serious
medical need.").
46 Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted) (emphases
added).
47 Ill-Equipped, supra note 27, at 95.
48 TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., State Survey, supra note 18, at 11.
49 Susan W. Brenner & David M. Galanti, Prisoners' Rights to Psychiatric Care, 21
IDAHO L. REV. 1, 29 (1985) ("In the psychological context . . . only those prisoners who
demonstrate blatant, abnormal behavior will be entitled to treatment.").
50 Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981) ("[T]he court should
consider the availability and expense of providing psychiatric treatment.").
51 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 12, at 353 ("[C]ost concerns cannot be considered in
determining prisoners' medical care rights.").
52 Frank, supra note 12, at 356 ("[T]here appears to remain a fair amount of confusion
as to whether cost can ever be a legitimate consideration that precludes a finding of deliberate
indifference.").
53 Id. at 348 ("[A] rule without reason simply will not do.").
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burden.54 Proving the mens rea of recklessness requires strong evidence that
speaks to prison administrators' internal state of mind.55 Courts' deference to
prison administration and inmates' limited resources hamper inmates' ability to
meet this standard.6 Indeed, many Estelle cases are lost for failure to satisfy the
subjective prong,57 and these denials include legitimate claimants.58 Mentally ill
inmates are particularly disadvantaged because awareness of nuanced mental
59disorders is especially hard to prove.
Some courts have attempted to remedy this flaw by shifting towards a
negligence-based standard.60 These efforts are unlikely to save Estelle because
they are vulnerable to the charge that they constitutionalize medical
54 E.g., Drissel, supra note 15, at 108 ("[T]he threshold for stating a constitutional
claim for violation of the right to mental health treatment under the Eighth Amendment is
very high.").
55 See, e.g., Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The infliction
of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. This is what the word means
today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth century.") (emphasis added), overruled by Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994).
56 See, e.g., DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Medical evidence
about the cause of the infection was inconclusive. Documentary proof was scant; in point of
fact, the evidence was scattershot as to whether, and if so, to what extent, the prison's medical
staff was required to document the delivery of routine services.").
57 See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847 ("[W]e reject petitioner's arguments and hold that
a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane
conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious
harm.") (emphasis added); Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Peirce, 612 F.2d 754, 760 (3d
Cir. 1979) ("On this record, we perceive no 'deliberate indifference' to the inmates' serious
medical needs in disregard of the standard enunciated in [Estelle].").
58 See, e.g., Brenner & Galanti, supra note 49, at 29 ("In the psychological context,
[Estelle's subjective intent requirement] means that only those prisoners who demonstrate
blatant, abnormal behavior will be entitled to treatment."); Friedman, supra note 28, at 946
(arguing that Estelle is "an inappropriate measure of the constitutionality of prison health care
provision" because of its subjective intent requirement); Genty, supra note 28, at 380-81
(claiming that the use of a subjective standard is misguided).
59 Lori A. Marschke, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for Mentally
Ill Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 487, 490 (2004) ("Given the complexities of mental illness
and prison guards' general lack of awareness of mental health needs, the mentally ill face a
tougher burden in proving actual knowledge than their physically ill counterparts.")
60 See, e.g., Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 1981)
("[G]ross negligent conduct creates a strong presumption of deliberate indifference."); Todaro
v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[R]epeated examples of such treatment bespeak a
deliberate indifference by prison authorities."); Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp. 522, 536
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[T]he inference of such indifference may be based upon proof of a series of
individual failures by the prison to provide adequate medical care even if each such failure-
viewed in isolation-might amount only to simple negligence.").
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malpractice.6' Others object to the relevance of the prison's "state of mind"
altogether, arguing that the severity of the harm should determine culpability.
62
Justice Stevens raised this very point in his Estelle dissent:
I believe the Court improperly attaches significance to the subjective
motivation of the defendant as a criterion for determining whether cruel
and unusual punishment has been inflicted. Subjective motivation may
well determine what, if any, remedy is appropriate against a particular
defendant. However, whether the constitutional standard has been
violated should turn on the character of the punishment.
63
This more radical rejection of Estelle is persuasive. Estelle's motivating purpose
is to protect inmates from harmful conditions, and thus it makes sense that the
standard should focus on the nature of the injury, not prisons' intent.
3. Limited Practical Bite
Even when inmates' claims successfully navigate the uncertainty of Estelle's
objective and subjective prongs, judicial findings of culpability can have little
practical effect. An infamous California case initiated in 1990 and decided as
Brown v. Plata64 in 2011 illustrates this phenomenon. Although the Court
strongly condemned the treatment of mentally ill inmates as violative of Estelle,65
this decades-long saga is still not resolved. Victory in court under Estelle has
done little to ameliorate the horrendous conditions mentally ill inmates in
California face.6 6 The California correctional system was largely unmoved by the
Court's poignant but lofty constitutional pronouncements, and it does not stand
alone in this recalcitrance. This shows that the Estelle standard requires drastic
61 Langley, 715 F. Supp. at 536 ("[Tlhe Eighth Amendment does not constitutionalize
the law of medical malpractice."); see also Fred Cohen, Captives' Legal Right to Mental
Health Care, 17 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 22 (1993) ("[A] complaint that a physician has been
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.") (emphasis added).
62 See, e.g., Genty, supra note 28, at 380-81 (1996) (claiming that the use of a
subjective standard is misguided because asking courts to consider prisons' intent creates a
safe harbor when the impact of unintentional actions is egregious).
63 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
65 Id. at 1923 ("For years the medical and mental health care provided by California's
prisons has fallen short of minimum constitutional requirements and has failed to meet
prisoners' basic health needs. Needless suffering and death have been the well-documented
result.").
66 Id. at 1924 ("Because of a shortage of treatment beds, suicidal inmates may be held
for prolonged periods in telephone-booth sized cages without toilets.").
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modification, if not wholesale substitution, to fulfill the purpose with which the
Court originally conceived it.
67
C. Advocating for Romeo's Youngberg
In Youngberg, the Court found Estelle inadequate for the civilly
committed.68 It rejected the component of Romeo's claim based on the Eighth
Amendment, ruling that unlike an inmate's claim, Romeo's was properly
assessed under the Fourteenth Amendment.69 It grounded this bifurcation in an
assertion that the involuntarily committed are "entitled to more considerate
treatment . . . than criminals" °70 because the purpose of their confinement is
treatment, not punishment. To provide more robust protection, the Youngberg
Court created a new standard-"professional judgment"-that instructs courts to
defer to professionals in determining whether treatment is constitutionally
adequate.7'
In sharp contrast to Estelle, Youngberg imposes affirmative obligations. To
satisfy Youngberg, the state must provide "training" that preserves individuals'
ability to care for themselves when not confined;72 Estelle completely rejects
rehabilitative rights.7 3 Moreover, in directly asserting a protective right to care,
Youngberg sidesteps Estelle's hypocrisy. Youngberg, unlike Estelle, does not
attempt to reconcile its positive purpose and a negative "no deliberate
indifference" framework. For this reason, Youngberg is a better judicial lodestar.
It rightly focuses on the central issue of treatment instead of the secondary
question of intent.74
Youngberg also trumps Estelle because it more adequately guards against
judicial interference with medical expertise. Under Youngberg, a treatment
decision is presumptively valid unless it "is such a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment . . . as to demonstrate that the person responsible
67 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 42 (1993) ("Were the issue squarely presented,
therefore, I might vote to overrule Estelle .... I seriously doubt that Estelle was correctly
decided .... ") (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68 Although the claim in Youngberg was brought by an institutionalized mentally
disabled individual, the Court's holding is broadly applicable to committed individuals,
including the mentally ill. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 n.25 (1982).
69 Id. at 324.
70 Id. at 322.
71 Id. at 323.
72 Id. at 327.
73 See, e.g., Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1054, 1124 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (finding
that a lack of rehabilitative programs does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
74 Brenner & Galanti, supra note 49, at 31 ("A better approach would be to begin with
the presumption that all prisoners have a constitutional right to psychiatric care.").
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actually did not base the decision on such a judgment ' ' 75 Youngberg further
retreats from the realm of medicine by emphasizing that a court's inquiry does
not properly involve a comparative assessment of the potentially numerous
treatment options available in a given case.7 6 It leaves this to the medical
professionals. Estelle, in contrast, instructs courts to conjecture about what
qualifies as a medically "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 77
III. BLURRING THE LINE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Estelle and Youngberg's inequality is by design. Indeed, the Youngberg
Court's discriminatory intent is made plain through its explicit positioning of
inmates' rights below the rights of the committed. 78 Although this
straightforward reading of Youngberg invites equal protection review of the
Estelle-Youngberg double standard, this constitutional territory is uncharted.
Most of the inmate equal protection literature and cases compares inmates to
inmates.79 The few that view inmates' rights in juxtaposition to non-inmates'80 do
not examine the treatment rights double standard.81 This Part of the Note
75 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
76 Id. at 321 ("[T]he Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that
professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify
which of several professionally acceptable choices should have been made.").
77 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976)).
78 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22 ("Persons who have been involuntarily committed are
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals .... ").
79 See, e.g., Rachel C. Grunberger, Johnson v. California: Setting a Constitutional Trap
for Prison Officials, 65 MD. L. REV. 271, 294 (2006) (discussing the appropriate level of equal
protection review for racial segregation of inmates); James F. Homer, Jr., Constitutional
Issues Surrounding the Mass Testing and Segregation of HIV-Infected Inmates, 23 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 369 (1993) (claiming that courts will likely never find compelled HIV testing of
inmates and status-based segregation violative of equal protection); Michelle Masotto, "Death
Is Different": Limiting Health Care for Death Row Inmates, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 317 (2014)
(arguing that death row inmates are not entitled to the same healthcare as other inmates under
equal protection); Joanna E. Saul, This Game Is Rigged: The Unequal Protection of Our
Mentally-Ill Incarcerated Women, 5 MOD. AM. 42 (asserting that male and female inmates are
similarly situated with respect to mental health treatment due to equal dependence on the state
for care).
80 See, e.g., Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110 (1966) (finding that equal
protection entitles inmates to the same civil commitment procedures as non-inmates); see also
Sharona Hoffman, Beneficial and Unusual Punishment: An Argument in Support of Prisoner
Participation in Clinical Trials, 33 IND. L. REV. 475 (2000) (arguing that laws barring inmates
from clinical trials violate equal protection).
81 Part I of this Note mentions the one article that is an exception and explains that its
limitations, namely, its lack of legal analysis and distance from mental health, leave this Note
to occupy this field. Posner, supra note 12, at 347.
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responds to this invitation to subject Estelle to a new form of equal protection
review. And it finds that in relegating individuals like Gamble to second-class
health, the double standard violates equal protection.
A. Similarly III and Confined
Inmates and the civilly committed are similarly situated with respect to their
reliance on the state for treatment. Generally, to qualify as similarly situated
under the Constitution, groups only need to share characteristics that relate to the
claimed service. 82 In this context, the claimed service is mental healthcare and an
inmate suffering from the same illness as a committed individual has a need that
warrants similar treatment. Because of the high prevalence of mental illness in
prisons, this line of reasoning applies to inmates on a wide scale.
Some courts have employed a less claimant-friendly definition of "similarly
situated" to inmates. In Klinger v. Department of Corrections, for instance, the
Eighth Circuit considered a range of factors, including security level and inmate
numerosity, in comparing inmates across genders.83 It denied the gender-based
equal protection claim because of differences in these other traits between
genders.8m If this same analysis were applied to mentally ill inmates, they might
not look so similar to the civilly committed. These groups vary in several
dimensions, including security and numerosity.85 Yet the wide-ranging Klinger
analysis is on shaky ground. It includes factors that are irrelevant to the equal
protection inquiry, which should focus exclusively on traits related to the
challenged state action.86 In the context of the Estelle- Youngberg double
standard, the challenged action is differentiated treatment rights, so only
82 See, e.g., Betts v. McCaughtry, 827 F. Supp. 1400, 1405 (W.D. Wis. 1993), aff'd, 19
F.3d 21 (7th Cir. 1994) ("To be 'similarly situated,' groups need not be identical in makeup,
they need only share commonalities that merit similar treatment."); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 422 (Conn. 2008) ("[T]he question is 'not whether persons are
similarly situated for all purposes, but whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the
law challenged.') (citation omitted).
83 31 F.3d 727, 731-32 (8th Cir. 1994).
84 Id. at 727.
85 TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., State Survey, supra note 18, at 15 (finding that there
are ten times more seriously mentally ill individuals in prisons than in civil institutions).
86 See, e.g., Angie Baker, Leapfrogging over Equal Protection Analysis: The Eighth
Circuit Sanctions Separate and Unequal Prison Facilities for Males and Females in Klinger
v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994), 76 NEB. L. REV. 371, 386 (1997)
("In determining that women inmates were not 'similarly situated' to male inmates, the
appeals court considered variables that, even taken together, failed to sustain its findings.");
Brenda V. Smith, Watching You, Watching Me, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 225, 275 (2003)
("Although these propositions are true, the analysis tends toward circular logic because [they
are used to avoid comparing the trait that is actually relevant to the challenged action].").
16:1 (2016)
16
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 16 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol16/iss1/3
ANTIDOTES TO THE DOUBLE STANDARD
treatment factors should enter the fray.
Indeed, a number of courts have specifically rebuked Klinger's logic in the
context of inmates' mental health rights.87 In Baxstrom v. Herold, for instance,
the Court found that equal protection entitles inmates to the same civil
commitment procedures as everyone else.88 It reasoned that the use of different
standards for inmates and non-inmates is "arbitrary,, 89 rejecting the claim that
criminality warrants differentiation.90 In explanation, the Court asserted that
equal protection requires that "a distinction made have some relevance to the
purpose for which the classification is made"91 and criminality is not germane to
mental illness. This logic applies neatly to the Estelle-Youngberg controversy.
The purpose of the classifications in this context is to determine treatment
rights-both Estelle and Youngberg were crafted for this reason. Under
Baxstrom, criminality is an unwelcome trespasser in this health-focused area of
government action.
Baxstrom's relevance could be challenged on the ground that it involved an
inmate "nearing the expiration point of a prison term 92-in other words, an
individual bordering on being a non-inmate. In this light, Baxstrom's rejection of
the relevance of criminality could be viewed as a result of the fact that it was
essentially comparing non-inmates to non-inmates. Yet this overlooks the fact
that today's Gambles also sit at the border between inmates and non-inmates.
Mentally ill inmates tend to rapidly cycle in and out of prison93 so for significant
portions of their stays, they could be characterized as near the end of their terms.
Moreover, this objection ignores the Baxstrom Court's broad, unequivocal
87 See, e.g., Souder v. McGuire, 516 F.2d 820, 821-22 (3d Cir. 1975) (finding that a
mental health law that allows officials to use less rigorous commitment procedures for
inmates than non-inmates raises "serious equal protection" issues); U.S. ex rel. Schuster v.
Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1073 (2d Cir. 1969) ("[W]e believe that before a prisoner may be
transferred to a state institution for insane criminals, he must be afforded substantially the
same procedural safeguards as are provided in civil commitment proceedings."); Evans v.
Paderick, 443 F. Supp. 583, 585 (E.D. Va. 1977) (refusing to construe a civil commitment
statute to exempt inmates from protection because of their criminal status).
88 383 U.S. 107, 110 (1966) ("We hold that petitioner was denied equal protection of
the laws by the statutory procedure under which a person may be civilly committed at the
expiration of his penal sentence without the jury review available to all other persons civilly
committed.").
891d. at 111.
90 Id. ("The director contends that the State has created a reasonable classification
differentiating the civilly insane from the 'criminally insane."').
91 Id. (citing Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954)).
92 Id. at 114.
93 TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., State Survey, supra note 18, at 9 ("In the Los Angeles
County Jail, 90 percent of mentally ill inmates are repeat offenders, with 31 percent having
been incarcerated ten or more times.").
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language disclaiming the relevance of criminality to mental health treatment.
Alternatively, one could argue that Baxstrom, a case about the right not to be
civilly committed, is inapposite because it involves the right to avoid treatment.
According to this line of attack, Baxstrom disclaims the relevance of criminality
because it has no bearing on the right to refuse treatment-even inmates retain
this right.94 A proponent of this argument could claim that the double standard, in
contrast, properly accounts for criminality because it is relevant to positive
treatment rights. Society's obligation to care for inmates is related to criminality
because crime is the basis of their confinement and reliance on the state. This
objection fails because it overlooks the fact that Estelle and Youngberg, like
Baxstrom, also protect the right to refuse treatment. Overtreatment can constitute
deliberate indifference or departure from professional judgment. 96 Thus,
Baxstrom is not distinguishable on this point. It requires that courts drop
criminality from their Estelle analysis, and find Gamble and Romeo similarly
situated.97
B. Fundamental Right to Healthcare
That mentally ill inmates and the committed mentally ill are similarly
situated does not end the equal protection inquiry. Similarly situated groups can
be treated differently if there is a valid reason, which depends on the nature of the
right and level of constitutional scrutiny.98 Mentally ill inmates' claims are
entitled to the most demanding level of review, strict scrutiny, because they seek
protection of a fundamental right.
99
Estelle established treatment as a fundamental right for inmates when it
found this entitlement in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. °00 It
94 See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
95 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1336 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd in part,
688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982).
96 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 310 (1982).
97 For a discussion of why inmates are similarly situated to non-inmates with respect to
healthcare rights of another sort, see Sharona Hoffman, Beneficial and Unusual Punishment:
An Argument in Support of Prisoner Participation in Clinical Trials, 33 IND. L. REv. 475, 505
(2000) (arguing that laws barring inmates from clinical trials violates their right to equal
protection with non-inmates).
98 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) ("[A] reasonable and sensitive
judgment must [recognize] that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the
state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.").
99 See Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 601 (2000) ("[T]he Court has extended strict
scrutiny to classifications that implicate so-called 'fundamental interests."').
100 See Michele Westhoff, An Examination of Prisoners' Constitutional Right to
Healthcare: Theory and Practice, HEALTH LAWYER, Aug. 2008, at 1, 5 ("This historic
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explained its holding in terms strongly reminiscent of fundamental rights
generally, which are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'0' The
Estelle Court pointed to America's long tradition of prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment as consistent with the constitutional drafters' intentions. 102 it
specified that these historical beliefs not only proscribe outright torture, but also
the suffering that can result from the denial of medical care. This conclusion,
according to the Estelle Court, is based on "elementary principles"''0 3 with deep
roots in common law.'°4 In other words, the right to healthcare is fundamental.
Although there are few grounds for convincingly arguing against this
interpretation of Estelle since its holding is explicitly rooted in the Eighth
Amendment's fundamental protections, one could object that relying on Estelle
while attacking it is unsound. Yet this Note does not argue against Estelle in its
entirety. It supports Estelle's assertion of a fundamental right to healthcare but
views Estelle's implementation of this premise as self-defeating.
C. Inmates as Discrete and Insular
Mentally ill inmates' claims for care are also entitled to strict scrutiny, which
subjects prisons' actions to the most stringent form of review, on the basis that
inmates constitute a discrete and insular minority. Courts have tended to place
inmates at the bottom of the constitutional classificatory totem pole, only
entitling their claims to rational basis review, which almost always upholds the
challenged government conduct.0 5 Yet a growing contingent of courts is bucking
decision [Estelle] marked the first time in history that the Supreme Court had recognized a
fundamental right to healthcare for any group of Americans.") (emphasis added).
101 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
102 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) ("[T]he primary concern of the drafters
was to proscribe 'torture(s)' and other 'barbar(ous)' methods of punishment.").
103 Id. at 103.
104 Id. at 103-04 ("The infliction of such unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with
contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modem legislation codifying the
common-law view that '(i)t is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who
cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself."') (citation omitted).
105 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) ("[T]here must be a 'valid,
rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest
put forward to justify it.") (citation omitted); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979)
("[T]he determination whether these restrictions and practices constitute punishment in the
constitutional sense depends on whether they are rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive
governmental purpose."); Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2000); Nicholas v.
Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1997); Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821-22 (5th Cir.
1997); Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1997); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281,
1286 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. King, 62 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1995).
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this trend106 and prominent scholars are supportive. They assert that inmates are
entitled to strict scrutiny because they fit squarely within United States v.
Carolene Products 107 footnote four's definition of a discrete and insular
minority.'
08
In its famous footnote four, the Carolene Products Court called for a "more
searching judicial inquiry" when discrimination is alleged against "discrete and
insular minorities."10 9 In the same breath, it mentioned racial, religious, and
ethnic minorities, but with no hint of exclusivity. Mentally ill inmates also
qualify as discrete and insular because societal prejudice against them likewise
"tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon." 1'  Widespread voting right bans, poverty,"
2 and stigma113
limit their ability to influence politics and legislation. This is precisely the type of
disempowerment Carolene Products' footnote four identifies as cause for courts
106 See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716-17 (2005) ("To secure redress for
inmates who encountered undue barriers to their religious observances, Congress carried over
from RFRA the 'compelling governmental interest'/'least restrictive means' standard.");
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (finding that strict scrutiny should apply to the
prison case at hand since it involved racial discrimination); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Prisoners are truly the outcasts of society.
Disenfranchised, scorned and feared . . . prisoners are surely a 'discrete and insular
minority. "') (emphasis added).
107 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (establishing, in
a landmark case, that courts' standards of review should vary according to the nature of the
given constitutional claim).
108 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 449-60 (1999) ("[Inmates] are [a] classic example[] of [a] discrete
and insular minorit[y], who have little political power."); Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing
Compassion into the Province of Judging: Justice Blackmun and the Outsiders, 71 N. DAK. L.
REV. 173, 176 (1995) ("Prison inmates may be the least sympathetic group of "outsiders" in
our constitutional jurisprudence."); James E. Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act: A "Not Exactly," Equal Protection Analysis, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
105, 157 (2000) ("Carolene Products supports classifying inmates [as a discrete and insular
minority] because modern prisoners are, in many relevant ways, similar to Carolene-era
blacks.").
109 Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
110 Id.
111 George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement As Punishment: Reflections on the Racial
Uses ofInfamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1898 (1999).
112 James E. Robertson, The Jurisprudence of the PLRA: Inmates As "'Outsiders" and
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 209 n.85 (2002)
("About one-half of inmates free for a year or more before their arrest reported incomes under
$10,000; nineteen percent reported incomes less than $3,000.").
113 Jason Schnittker, The Psychological Dimensions and the Social Consequences of
Incarceration, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 122 (2014) (discussing "the stigma
of a criminal record").
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to heighten their protection through strengthened review of government conduct.
Post-Carolene courts have offered little additional guidance as to what
constitutes a "discrete and insular minority."' 14 The appellation was first applied
to racial minorities but the cases did not elaborate the constitutional
characteristic.15 Aliens were next and were even called a "prime example," but
again, with little by way of explanation."l6 Courts' findings about who does not
belong are more instructive. For instance, old people were denied this
classification under the rationale that everyone (life circumstances permitting)
becomes old. 17 Inmates survive this test. Unlike old age, incarceration is not
inevitable.
Scholars have helped fill the definitional void left by courts. An elucidation
proposed by Bruce Ackerman,
18 characterized as the "most widely accepted,",
' 19
explains that a "discrete" minority's "members are marked out in ways that make
it relatively easy for others to identify them."'120 As an example, he notes that
African American women qualify as "discrete" because they cannot plausibly
hide their traits.1 21 Arguably, inmates are even more "discrete" under Ackerman's
definition. African American women could, no doubt with a lot of trouble, hide
or minimize their race and gender traits through aesthetic choices. Inmates, on
the other hand, can do nothing to minimize their confinement; by definition it
marks their status against their will.
Ackerman's refinement of the term "insular" is also supportive. He defines
insularity as "the tendency of group members to interact with great frequency in
114 See Harvie Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the
Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 981 (1975) ("A court's act of
designating groups as 'discrete and insular' has so far been more a matter of feel on the part of
the court than of any rationally justifiable process. The label is more emotive than
analytical.").
115 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978)
(casting doubt on the importance of "discreteness and insularity" in determining the standard
of review).
116 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
117 Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) ("[O]ld age does not
define a 'discrete and insular' group . . . in need of 'extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.' Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live
out our normal span.").
118 Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
Although Ackerman's central thesis is that footnote four is flawed, his critique does not lessen
the doctrine's applicability to inmates. Ackerman contends that discreteness and insularity
may in fact be indicative of political power, and not disenfranchisement. As this Note
discusses, inmates have essentially no political power.
119 Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135,
149 (2011).
120 Ackerman, supra note 118, at 729.
121 Id.
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a variety of social contexts."'22 Inmates interact with one another in every social
context; their confinement limits them to each other's company. Moreover, their
interactions are frequent before and after incarceration. Inmates predominantly
belong to certain socioeconomic groups,1 23 and these groups tend to cohere
outside prison walls as well. 124
D. Fatal in Fact
The application of strict scrutiny to the double standard is bound to be fatal,
regardless of whether this standard of review is triggered by the fundamental
nature of inmates' right to treatment25 or their status as a discrete and insular
minority.' 26 Strict scrutiny instructs courts to determine whether the challenged
action serves a "compelling interest" and is "narrowly tailored" to further this
interest.1 27 Since the state usually fails at least one of these tests, strict scrutiny is
considered a death knell for challenged government actions.
1 28
In the prison context, the government interest most often raised as
compelling is safety.129 Although courts usually defer to prisons on safety
matters, 13 strict scrutiny demands a more searching inquiry. By instructing
122 Id. at 726.
123 Robertson, supra note 112, at 209 n.85 ("About one-half of inmates free for a year
or more before their arrest reported incomes under $10,000; nineteen percent reported
incomes less than $3,000.").
124 Douglas S. Massey et al., The Changing Bases of Segregation in the United States,
626 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sc. 74, 74 (2009) ("During the last third of the
twentieth century, the United States moved toward a new regime of residential segregation
characterized by moderating racial-ethnic segregation and rising class segregation.").
125 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) ("[The government cannot] infringe
certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.").
126 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
127 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) ("[S]uch classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental
interests.").
128 See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)
(referring to strict scrutiny review as "the aggressive 'new' equal protection, with scrutiny that
was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
129 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 512 (2005) (finding that prison safety
is "a compelling government interest"); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968)
(entertaining "the necessities of prison security and discipline" as compelling interests).
130 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987) (finding a prison rule "entitled to
deference on the basis of the significant impact of prison correspondence on the liberty and
safety of other prisoners and prison personnel").
16:1 (2016)
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courts to assess whether the government action is "narrowly tailored" to achieve
the compelling interest, this level of review requires courts to abandon any
presumption of relevancy. Indeed, how the double standard contributes to safety
is far from clear. Evidence suggests that instead of improving safety, the double
standard undermines it. Without Youngberg's more robust treatment rights,
mentally ill inmates are more likely to be victims of prison violence,'32 to inflict
harm,' 33 and to drain management resources that could otherwise be expended on
safety measures.114 Estelle therefore falls flat under equal protection review.
IV: JUDICIAL MALPRACTICE: ROMEO'S INCARCERATION
Although no court has explicitly recognized the equal protection
implications of the double standard, a number have applied Youngberg in
prisons. 35 This could be evidence of an appreciation of the strength of mentally
ill inmates' equal protection claims. Yet the confused nature of some of these
applications136 suggests that many judges are struggling to administer Estelle and
131 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 ("[S]trict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for
carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the government's reasons for using [a
given trait] in a particular context.") (emphasis added).
132 See Ill-Equipped, supra note 27, at 101 ("Compared to other prisoners, moreover,
prisoners with mental illness also are more likely to be exploited and victimized by other
inmates.").
133 See Brandi Grissom, A Tie to Mental Illness in Violence Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/health/a-tie-to-mental-illness-in-the-
violence-behind-bars.html ("It is not surprising that prisons with a greater proportion of
mentally ill inmates would have more violence than others.").
134 TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., State Survey, supra note 18, at 10 ("Because of their
impaired thinking, many inmates with serious mental illnesses are major management
problems.").
135 Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp. 522, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[S]ince Youngberg
was decided, a number of courts have invoked its standards to adjudicate claims of denial of
medical care by convicted prisoners."); see also Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the
"Experts": From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102
YALE L.J. 639, 717 (1992) ("As the professional judgment standard has been expanded
beyond the mental health system, claims such as those against prisons and jails for not
providing adequate treatment or screening for suicidal or mentally disabled prisoners and
pretrial detainees also fall into this category.").
136 This Note does not aim to provide a comprehensive presentation of the myriad ways
that courts cross-apply and confuse Estelle and Youngberg. Rather, it illustrates courts'
tendencies with select cases. For additional examples of judges applying Youngberg in prisons
in health-related contexts, see Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Santana v. Collazo,
793 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1986); Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1985); Harding v.
Kuhlmann, 588 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd mem., 762 F.2d 990 (2d Cir.1985); and
Newby v. Serviss, 590 F. Supp. 591 (W.D. Mich. 1984).
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Youngberg properly, blurring the standards in an unprincipled way. It follows,
then, that replacing Estelle with Youngberg is no panacea since the contours of
the standards tend to fall apart in application.
A. Youngberg Behind Bars
Some courts that apply Youngberg in prisons provide forthright
explanations. Their reasoning tends to focus on one critical point-inmates and
the civilly committed are equally dependent on the state because of their
confinement. Langley v. Coughlin, a case brought in the Southern District of
New York challenging a prison's failure to address the mental health needs of
inmates in solitary confinement, is a prime example.13 7 In applying Youngberg,
the Langley court explained that inmates and committed individuals' right to care
"rests in significant measure upon the same rationale."' 38 Namely, that the state
has limited each individual's "freedom to act on his own behalf."' 39 The district
court concludes that this "unitary theory" requires equivalent standards,
regardless of the purpose of confinement.
40
The logic in cases like Langley14' supports the substance of this Note's equal
protection argument even though it does not raise equal protection explicitly.
Like this Note, these courts consider the similarity between inmates and
committed individuals' needs to be dispositive, and they reject the relevance of
the purpose of confinement. This line of precedent also suggests that this Note's
initial proposal that Youngberg supplant Estelle is not beyond the realm of
possibility-that some judges have already made this change reflects
receptiveness.
B. Conflating Romeo and Gamble
Other larger142 pockets of Estelle-Youngberg case law, with more limited
expositions of the reasons behind application of a given standard, provide less
cause for optimism. They reveal that a significant cohort of judges confuse
Estelle and Youngberg such that the standard they purport to apply does not in
fact determine the outcomes of their cases. Collectively, these misapplications
137 Langley, 715 F. Supp. at 531.
138 Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
139 Id. at 539.
140 Id.
141 For another illustrative example, see White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 113 (3d Cir.
1990), in which the court held, "Just as it does for mental patients, the State must provide ...
treatment for inmates."
142 See Stefan, supra note 135, at 705 ("[C]ourts rarely undertake to explain the logic
behind their extension of the professional judgment standard to this very different scenario.").
16:l1(2016)
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suggest hat judicial malpractice in this arena is widespread, and relying solely on
judicial reform would therefore be unwise.
Some courts recognize Estelle's relevance but the standard they apply reads
nothing like Estelle. One court, for instance, purports to apply Estelle but the
language it lays out closely approximates Youngberg: "The [E]ighth
[A]mendment protects inmates from an environment in which degeneration is
probable and self improvement unlikely."'' 43 In fact, it is Youngberg that protects
specifically against "deteriorati[on]" 144 and supports self-improvement by
requiring "training."'' 45 Estelle, in contrast, does not protect rehabilitation. 146 The
court only mentions Youngberg to disclaim its applicability, 47 which suggests
that it is unaware that the standard it is applying is, in effect, Youngberg.
One could argue that judges who opine in this manner148 are not confused;
they are sneaky. They agree with the judges who openly proclaim Youngberg's
applicability but choose not to name Youngberg to guard their opinions against
being overturned for applying the "wrong" standard. This Note does not pretend
to discern judges' unstated intentions, but it still finds this explanation
unpersuasive. The case law this Note reviewed contained no evidence of such
sleight of hand and there are indications that judges are prone to such malpractice
in other contexts. 149
V. YOUNGBERG'S DEMISE: THE WRONG PRESCRIPTION
Youngberg's desirability as a substitute for Estelle is questionable on more
than as applied grounds. Youngberg has flaws that counsel against its use
143 Capps v. Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894, 901 (D. Or. 1982) (emphases added).
144 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 327 (1982).
145 Id. at 322 ("[R]espondent is entitled to minimally adequate training.") (emphasis
added).
146 See, e.g., Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1124 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (finding
that a lack of rehabilitative programs does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
147 Capps, 559 F. Supp. at 917 (D. Or. 1982) (referring to Youngberg as a standard
applicable in "another context").
148 For other examples, see Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1989); Zwalesky
v. Manistee County, 749 F. Supp. 815 (W.D. Mich. 1990); McCloud v. Delaney, 677 F. Supp.
230 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); and Willis v. Barksdale, 625 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. Tenn. 1985). For
examples of how the malpractice runs in both directions-courts also bungle Youngberg in
ways that resemble Estelle in controversies implicating civil institutions-see Strutton v.
Meade, 668 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2012); Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2008); Elizabeth
M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2006); and Moore ex rel. Moore v. Briggs, 381 F.3d
771 (8th Cir. 2004).
149 Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 233 (2009) (finding based on an empirical review that judicial
standards "are often abused in practice").
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irrespective of judicial malpractice. Appellate courts could conceivably make
Youngberg more manageable by issuing clarifying opinions, but this would only
strengthen the influence of Youngberg's inherent inadequacies.150 It suffers from
at least three serious defects.
First, the Youngberg standard is vulnerable to the charge that it demands
judicial abandonment of a core right.15 1 It instructs courts to apply a strong
presumption of constitutionality to actions undertaken according to professional
judgment, and at the same time provides no strict limit to what qualifies as
professional judgment. " 2 As a result, Youngberg protects a range of harms.
Professional judgment is not necessarily consistent with inmates' rights. A
physician might well be exercising some professional judgment in withholding
painkillers from an inmate in extreme pain because she fears inciting a substance
abuse problem. Yet the inmate's right to adequate treatment could still be
compromised.
Second, by deemphasizing claimants' rights, Youngberg can be read as
expressively bankrupt.'53 Its deep deference to professionals emphasizes the
importance of their right to practice freely, according to their own standards.
Youngberg's silence about the rights of the confined could be interpreted as
suggesting that any benefit they might receive under the standard is secondary to
the protection of professionals' right to follow their judgment.
Finally, Youngberg is only as robust as the resources available to
professionals.'54 And prisons, and by implication their professional staff, are
increasingly resource-starved.155 This doctrinal flimsiness is so prejudicial to
150 See, e.g., Capps, 559 F. Supp. at 917 ("This state of the psychiatric art makes it all
the more difficult for me to distinguish between cases that show inmates receiving, on the one
hand, constitutionally inadequate treatment, and, on the other hand, treatment about which
mental health professionals could reasonably differ.").
151 E.g., Stefan, supra note 135, at 642 (arguing that "the court's crucial role in our
constitutional system" is lost under the Youngberg standard).
152 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (specifying that "liability may be
imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment").
153 Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 760 (1998) ("The expressive
dimension of governmental action plays a central, but underappreciated, role in constitutional
law.").
154 See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 n.15 (1988) (noting that professional
judgment is shaped by the government's limited resources).
155 NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON
POPULATION BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 1 (2014)
16:1 (2016)
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committed individuals that the Youngberg Court felt called upon to apologize:
"[The] presumption [of professionalism] is necessary to enable institutions of this
type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded and understaffed-to continue to
function." 156 This creates the paradox that institutions inflicting the most
egregious harm 57 might be least likely to be found liable. Indeed, the conditions
in many civil institutions under Youngberg's purview have long been described
as abysmal.58 The Court's creation of Youngberg has done little to change this
terrible reality.
VI. RESUSCITATING GAMBLE: THE DOUBLE-DOSE REMEDY
Recognizing the deficiencies of a purely judicial fix, this Part turns to
Congress to investigate the possibilities of a multi-branch remedy. In so doing, it
helps alleviate the tunnel vision that afflicts scholarship on mentally ill inmates.
Most articles consider what single solution is the most promising. 159 The
interwoven doctrinal and political issues underlying the plight of mentally ill
inmates, however, demand this Note's inclusive approach.'60 The dilemma is
essentially "a spider web, in which the tension of the various strands is
determined by the relationship among all the parts of the web."16'
A. Legislating Equality
Backdoor approaches, like statutory reform, could address Estelle's doctrinal
flaws without changing the standard itself. Prisons' de facto mental hospital
(explaining that the federal prison system is struggling with "the increasing cost" of its
operations).
156 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
157 Stefan, supra note 134, at 691 ("The patient's treatment may not represent the result
of a decision or judgment at all, but simply a default in the absence of alternatives.").
158 See, e.g., Alex Hecht, Civil Rights of Institutionalized People, MD. B.J., Jan.-Feb.
2003, at 32, 32 (describing the "dire, often life-threatening, conditions" in which some
mentally ill civilly committed individuals live).
159 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 12, at 363 (proposing changes in the standard for
inmates' right to treatment but not looking to Congress).
160 This approach is not intended to be al/-inclusive. Its scope is restricted to
government actors, and it does not include a few government solutions-such as increased
federal intervention through more aggressive enforcement of the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a) (2012))-because their interaction with
the Estelle standard is relatively remote. It also leaves potential private sector solutions-like
social impact bond programs that increase prison resources-to works that focus on and can
thus fully examine the implications of private sector involvement.
161 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1936 (2011) (citations omitted).
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status 162 points to hospital laws as a potentially apt analogue and framework for
reform. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)
requires hospitals, within their capability, to provide appropriate health screening
to everyone who presents at emergency rooms.163 Estelle's central failing-its
restriction of liability to conditions prisons are aware of-could be mitigated by a
requirement like EMTALA's. 164 By putting prisons on notice, screening would
create strong grounds for arguing that a failure to treat violates Estelle because
prisons could no longer hide behind lack of awareness. Under an EMTALA-like
rubric, the dispositive inquiry would be whether prisons' judgment about how to
respond to detected mental illnesses is deliberately indifferent to medical
standards. This shift to scrutiny of prison professionals' actions, away from
consideration of their awareness of illness, would bring Estelle closer to
Youngberg. 1
65
This leap between the prison and hospital realms is not pie in the sky. A
small number of courts have already tried to save Estelle by interpreting it as
requiring screening. 166 Some have found a duty to conduct mental health
screenings in particular.167 Yet, however attractive a screening requirement might
be as a solution to the doctrinal puzzle, it is less appealing in terms of feasibility.
162 See, e.g., Christina Canales, Prisons: The New Mental Health System, 44 CONN. L.
REV. 1725, 1725 (2012) (arguing that "prisons have become the new mental health system");
Slovenko, supra note 16 ("[J]ails and prisons have become the new mental hospitals.").
163 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2012).
164 Currently, federal correctional institutions are not bound by a statutory duty to
screen inmates' health. Bureau of Prisons guidance, which is at the Bureau's discretion, is the
only national requirement. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2014 PERFORMANCE BUDGET-
CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION: FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM, SALARIES AND EXPENSES 28 (2014),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/05/08/bop-se-justification.pdf
("[Bureau of Prisons (("BOP)] policy requires that every inmate admitted to a BOP facility be
given an initial psychological screening."). Evidence suggests that prisons do not adhere to
these discretionary guidelines. See Ill-Equipped, supra note 27, at 101 ("[I]n many prison
systems screening and tracking of mentally ill prisoners is problematic. Prisoners with mental
illness are not identified upon entry into prison and are left untreated.").
165 Despite Youngberg's flaws, this shift is still desirable. See Rosalie Berger Levinson,
Wherefore Art Thou Romeo: Revitalizing Youngberg's Protection of Liberty for the Civilly
Committed, 54 B.C. L. REv. 535, 559 (2013) ("Despite its drawbacks, however, the
Youngberg standard has become the best shield for plaintiffs against arbitrary government
decision making.").
166 See, e.g., Feliciano v. Gonzalez, 13 F. Supp. 2d 151, 208 (D.P.R. 1998) (holding
that a failure to screen for infectious diseases is unconstitutional); Inmates of Occoquan v.
Barry, 717 F. Supp. 854, 867 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that a lack of syphilis and tuberculosis
screening constitutes deliberate indifference).
167 See, e.g., Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Peirce, 487 F. Supp. 638, 642 (W.D. Pa.
1980) (finding an Eighth Amendment violation in the lack of a "screening system for new
admittees to identify those with mental health problems").
16:1 (2016)
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It would encounter serious roadblocks, starting with the problem that mentally ill
inmates are not a politically sympathetic group. 68 The difficulty would be
aggravated by the fact that despite recent expansions in access to healthcare,1
69
access to mental healthcare remains acutely inadequate. 170 Strengthening this
right for inmates would likely not be popular when non-offenders are wanting.
Moreover, even when Congress does summon the will to enact laws to improve
care for mentally ill inmates, the promised opening of the purse strings does not
necessarily follow.171
B. A Uniform Standard as One Piece of the Puzzle
The barriers to a legislative fix are not insurmountable,172 but their existence
suggests that the most promising remedy will likely involve both legislative and
judicial change. The lack of public and congressional solicitude for mentally ill
inmates is susceptible to judicial influence. There is evidence that Supreme Court
168 See, e.g., Drissel, supra note 15 ("People who commit criminal offenses are often
marginalized. The general population has expressed little interest in ensuring or financing
their welfare .... Similarly, our society stigmatizes individuals with mental illness."); see
also Andrew P. Wilper et al., The Health and Health Care of US Prisoners: Results of a
Nationwide Survey, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 666, 671 (2009) ("Providing inmates with health
care is politically unpopular.").
169 Katherine L. Record, Litigating the ACA: Securing the Right to Health Within a
Framework of Negative Rights, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 537, 543 (2012) ("[T]he new law extends
access to care to an unprecedented number of Americans.").
170 See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, Expansion of Mental Health Care Hits Obstacles, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/us/expansion-of-mental-health-
care-hits-obstacles.html ("The need [for mental health treatment] is widely viewed as
great: Nearly one in five Americans has a diagnosable mental illness . . . but most get no
treatment.").
171 Human Rights at Home, supra note 26, at 281 (statement of Michael P. Randle,
Dir., Ill. Dep't of Corrections) ("Congress enacted the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and
Crime Reduction Act (MIOTCRA) in 2004 .... While the Act authorized $50 million to be
granted toward these efforts, only $21.5 million has been appropriated between fiscal years
2006-2009. Due in part to this lack of funding, coupled with record deficits, States and
counties have found themselves in dire circumstances with respect to treatment and
management of the mentally ill.").
172 Congress recently reauthorized a statute that funds programs that link local criminal
justice and mental health systems. Screening programs are eligible for MIOTCRA funding.
Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Reauthorization and Improvement Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-416, § 4, 122 Stat. 4352, 4353-54 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3797aa(h)
(2012)). Congress also recently demonstrated growing solicitude for mentally ill inmates by
convening a hearing focused on their plight. See Human Rights at Home, supra note 26, at 2-
3.
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positions affect public sentiment,73 and Congress, in turn, is influenced by
constituents' opinions.174 Thus, even if the uniform application of Youngberg to
the civilly committed and inmates would not result in meaningful change in
courts because of Youngberg's doctrinal flaws and judges' maladroitness, it
could help unlock legislative change.
What is more, this symbiosis truly runs in both directions. Each mode of
reform has the power to counteract the other's flaws-legislation could save
Estelle (or its replacement), and a Court decision that explicitly recognizes
mentally ill inmates' right to equal treatment could make legislation more likely.
Although this remedy requires two government institutions to act instead of one,
the formidability of this task is not cause for criticism. On the contrary, the
challenges of implementation are a reflection of the intractability of mentally ill
inmates' plight. This realism is a prerequisite for success.
C. Resistance to Reform
Thus far, this Note has presumed the desirability of improving care for
mentally ill inmates, even in acknowledging doctrinal and legislative challenges.
This Part engages with counterarguments that do not take this premise for
granted, as well as some objections to this Note's proposal that do. This
discussion is broken into four Sections addressing potential grounds for
objection: (1) fairness; (2) practicability; (3) effectiveness; and (4) adverse
outcomes. In responding to these charges, it finds that they do not, individually or
collectively, undermine the desirability of improving treatment.
1. Fairness
Objections to improving care for mentally ill inmates could be raised on
fairness grounds. Under this logic, helping individuals who have harmed society
173 This Note is arguing that insofar as public sentiment is influenced by the Court's
positions, judicial standards thereby influence publicly elected Members of Congress. Large
bodies of scholarship analyze the interactions between public sentiment, Supreme Court
jurisprudence, and Congress, and this Note leaves this ongoing debate to these devoted works.
For an example of one of the many pieces that support this Note's premise that the Court
influences the public, see James W. Stoutenborough et al., Reassessing the Impact of Supreme
Court Decisions on Public Opinion: Gay Civil Rights Cases, 59 POL. RESEARCH Q. 419
(2006).
174 Similarly, this Note is not taking a position on the controversial issue of how
responsive, exactly, Congress is to constituents. For an example of one of the many works that
dive deeply into this issue, see Lisa 0. Monaco, Give the People What They Want: The
Failure of "Responsive" Lawmaking, 3 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 735, 737 (1996)
(arguing "that the national legislature is increasingly responsive to individual manifestations,
such as phone calls, letters, e-mails, and faxes, of constituent preferences").
16:1 (2016)
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should not be the first step in solving a problem that affects law-abiding
citizens.175 This argument makes two mistakes. First, it draws a rigid line
between "criminals" and "citizens" that does not exist. Mentally ill inmates cycle
in and out of prison so often that they are known as "frequent flyers."'1
76
Improving their care also benefits the public because these inmates spend large
chunks of time as free citizens too. In addition, mentally ill inmates' offenses are
often nonviolent177 and stem from their illnesses,1 78 which could mitigate their
culpability. In this light, mentally ill inmates are not bona fide "criminals" and
are no less entitled to care than non-offenders.
Second, this counterargument overlooks the fact that improving treatment
for mentally ill inmates and caring for the public are not mutually exclusive.
There is no direct link between healthcare spending in and outside of prisons;
reductions in expenditures on prisoners do not necessarily accrue to the benefit of
the non-incarcerated ill. 179 Indeed, if there are manifest benefits to improving
care in prisons, this could motivate investment on the outside. Prisons could
function as laboratories of democracy.
2. Practicability
Detractors could also argue that there are practical barriers to improving
treatment for inmates. The most obvious contention is that improving care is
prohibitively costly, but this straightforward attack does not hold up.
175 See, e.g., Kate Douglas, Prison Inmates Are Constitutionally Entitled to Organ
Transplants-So Now What?, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 539, 544 (2005) ("[T]axpayers . .. dislike
the idea that tax dollars go to provide inmates with a medical procedure that many law-
abiding citizens are unable to afford."); Posner, supra note 12, at 363 ("[B]ased on notions of
fairness-it is not right that society spends a lot of money giving prisoners better medical care
than poor citizens who have not committed crimes.").
176 More Mentally Ill Persons Are in Jails and Prisons than Hospitals, TREATMENT
ADVOCACY CTR. & NAT'L SHERIFFS' ASS'N 10 (2010),
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/finalails v hospitalsstudy.pdf
("In the Los Angeles County Jail, 90 percent of mentally ill inmates are repeat offenders, with
31 percent having been incarcerated ten or more times.").
177 Christine M. Sarteschi, Mentally Ill Offenders Involved with the U.S. Criminal
Justice System, SAGE OPEN, July-Sept. 2013, at 1, 9 (2013),
http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/3/3/2158244013497029 ("Forty-eight percent of the
federal mentally ill inmates have been charged with drug trafficking crimes.").
178 Ill-Equipped, supra note 27, at 24 ("Thousands of mentally ill are left untreated and
unhelped until they have deteriorated so greatly that they wind up arrested and prosecuted for
crimes they might never have committed had they been able to access therapy, medication,
and assisted living facilities in the community.").
179 Posner, supra note 12, at 363 ("[T]here is no reason to believe that reducing the
amount that states spend on medical services for prisoners will result in better services for the
poor.").
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Incarcerating the mentally ill without providing adequate treatment, as is done
today, is in fact the costlier proposition. Inmates whose illnesses go untreated
cost the prison system more because they have longer stays and drain non-
medical management resources because of disciplinary issues. 
80
Other practical concerns, in contrast, are more justifiably characterized as
intractable. Prison medical staffs are of notoriously poor quality because of low
pay and the discomfort of working in prisons. 8 This barrier is not absolute,
however. The growing sensitivity to inmates' plight1 82 could attract higher
quality professionals.
Yet even if prisons addressed staffing problems, one could argue that
improving services would incentivize malingering. Mental illness has no surefire
test, 83 and a colorable argument could be made that everyone in prison is
mentally ill in some sense. Part of the punishment of confinement is its
psychological harm.184 Non-mentally-ill inmates might present for care to receive
comforting services they do not need. Although this concern has some
legitimacy, in today's prison healthcare context it is not a relevant line of
analysis. The risk of over-inclusive and wasteful care pales in comparison to the
likelihood inadequate treatment.' 
8 5
3. Effectiveness
From a mental health professional's perspective, improving care in prisons
might be for naught. With mentally ill inmates cycling in and out, and with few
treatment options on the outside, improved prison care could be undone by a lack
180 TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., State Survey, supra note 18, at 10.
181 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1927 (2011) ("Prisons were unable to retain
sufficient numbers of competent medical staff, and would hire any doctor who had a license, a
pulse and a pair of shoes.") (citations omitted).
182 See, e.g., Mary Clare Reim, The Surprising Ingredient for Bipartisan Reform: Hit
Show 'Orange Is the New Black,' DAILY SIGNAL (June 12, 2014),
http://dailysignal.com/2014/06/1 2/surprising-ingredient-bipartisan-reform-hit-show-orange-
new-black ("For many viewers, the show provides a spooky wake up call to the all-too-
disturbing reality of mass incarceration. . .. It's not just 'Orange is the New Black' viewers
who are beginning to feel uneasy and morally troubled about the current U.S. prison
system.").
183 Jacob Sullum, Finding a Place.for the Mentally Ill, CATO UNBOUND (Aug. 20,
2012), http://www.cato-unbound.org/20 I 2/08/20/jacob-sullum/finding-place-mentally-ill
(noting that "there is no objective biological or psychological test" for mental illnesses).
184 Andrew Cohen, Supermax: The Faces of a Prison's Mentally Ill, ATLANTIC (June
19, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/supermax-the-faces-of-a-
prisons-mentally-ill/258429 ("[T]he inhumane treatment of the men has made them mad, or at
least exacerbated their preexisting mental health problems.").
185 Ditton, supra note 24, at 9 (finding that at least forty percent of mentally ill inmates
receives no form of treatment).
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of continuity.186 This concern is well-founded, but instead of counseling against
improving care in prisons, it points to the related importance of post-release
support. Congress has recognized this need by allotting funding to programs that
provide recently released inmates with care.187 Moreover, quality care in prison
could identify mental illness in some individuals for the first time. Although
accessing care on the outside is challenging, individuals might be more receptive
to and able to benefit from treatment if they are aware that they need it.
4. Adverse Outcomes
Opponents could point to possible unintended negative consequences.
Without concurrent improvement in care on the outside, the mentally ill might be
incentivized to commit crimes to access care in prison.'88 In addition, improving
treatment could weaken prison safety if resources are shifted from security
management. 189 Both of these arguments are one-sided. The first does not
consider the fact that the downsides to incarceration-removal from family,
friends, and jobs, for instance-likely outweigh the allure of treatment for many.
The second does not account for the fact that resources allocated to care accrue to
safety as well. Better symptom management can improve ill inmates' ability to
navigate their incarceration with minimal risk to themselves and others.' 
90
There is another sense in which the cure could be viewed as worse than the
disease-bolstering treatment rights could result in overmedication. Evidence
suggests that some prison mental health staff protect against liability by erring in
this direction.'91 Arguably, a more robust right could aggravate this propensity.
186 Position Statement of AACP on Persons with Mental Illness Behind Bars, AM.
Ass'N COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRISTS (Mar. 15, 2001),
http://www.communitypsychiatry.org/pages.aspx?PageName=PositionStatement of AACP_
onPersons With Mental IllnessBehind Bars ("Upon release their decompensated mental
state, combined with unavailability of . . . community mental health and dual diagnosis
treatment, puts these individuals at risk for . . . psychiatric hospitalization, and re-
incarceration.").
187 See, e.g., Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Reauthorization
and Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-416, § 4, 122 Stat. 4352, 4353-54 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 3797aa(h) (2012)).
188 Chris Halsne, Expensive Trend: People Committing Crimes To Get Free Jail
Health Care, Fox NEWS (July 7, 2014), http://kdvr.com/2014/07/07/expensive-trend-people-
committing-crimes-to-get-free-jail-health-care.
189 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987) (holding that inmates' rights must be
balanced against prison safety needs and safety interests should supersede inmates' individual
rights).
190Ill-Equipped, supra note 27, at 60 ("[M]entally ill prisoners in state and federal
prisons as well as local jails are more likely than others to have been involved in a fight and
also more likely to have been charged with breaking prison rules.").
191 See Don Thompson, California Spends Big on Anti-Psychotics, ASSOCIATED PRESS
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Yet Estelle, even in its current weak form, has been interpreted as guarding
against overtreatment'92 and Youngberg's "professional" basis guards against
care that does not serve therapeutic purposes. Crucially, under-treatment looms
far larger'93 so a skewed solution is warranted.
Perhaps the most formidable argument against improving care is that this
solution is a temporary fix. Under this reasoning, the mentally ill do not belong in
prison regardless of the quality of care because the setting is inherently harmful
to their health and does not deter crime. "Better" care would mask confinement's
harm, and the resulting diminution in visible distress would obscure the need to
remove the mentally ill from prison. This argument is less compelling, however,
when the suffering of mentally ill inmates that is already public is taken into
account. No reforms came about even when it was revealed that one inmate died
every six to seven days in one prison system because of "constitutional
deficiencies" in healthcare.94 There is little reason to believe that more severe
tragedies, whatever they might be, would incite action when this one has not.
Therefore, obstruction of the visibility of harm is not likely to significantly derail
reform efforts, and improvements in care should not be avoided for this reason.
CONCLUSION: THE ANTIDOTES
It has been decades since Gamble and Romeo sought protection of their
healthcare rights from the Supreme Court. Although the Court overlooked their
fundamental similarity then, in the intervening years this resemblance has only
grown. Today, there are more Romeos in prison than in civil facilities. Yet the
Estelle-Youngberg double standard that grew out of Gamble and Romeo's cases
still relegates mentally ill inmates to second-class healthcare. This Note exposes
the doctrinal deficiency at the heart of this injustice-the double standard
violates mentally ill inmates' right to equal protection.
In response, this Note proposes that the antidote to the unconstitutional
Estelle-Youngberg double standard is not a uniform standard. A standard that
puts mentally ill inmates on equal footing with the civilly committed would solve
the doctrinal puzzle, but because of Youngberg's flaws and judicial malpractice
in this area of the law, in reality this reform would do little to help mentally ill
inmates. Therefore, the solution must necessarily look beyond courts, and, as this
(May 1, 2013), http:/Ibigstory.ap.org/article/ap-exclusive-calif-spends-big-anti-psychotics
("California's inmate mental health professionals appear to overmedicate their patients. Even
a former top prison mental health administrator acknowledged that fear of lawsuits often
drove the decisions about inmates' treatment.").
192 Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex., 1980), aff'd in part, 688 F.2d
266 (5th Cir. 1982).
193 Ditton, supra note 24, at 9.
194 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1927 (2011).
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Note suggests, also to Congress.
The doctrinal and political issues underlying mentally ill inmates' plight
demand such a multifaceted approach. Each mode of reform has the power to
counteract the other's limitations-legislation could save Estelle, and a holding
that explicitly recognizes inmates' equal right to care could make legislation
more likely. Thus, there is a long and winding road ahead to save Gamble from a
fate that is "little short of barbarous."'95 The first step likely lies outside of courts
and Congress, as within the general public's power. The pervasive antipathy for
the incarcerated and the mentally ill suggests that neither courts nor Congress are
likely to disrupt the status quo without an underlying shift in public awareness,
for fear of a backlash. To awaken courts to the similarity between Romeo and
Gamble and to spur Congress to hold prisons to account, society must first shed
its stigma against this vulnerable population.
195 Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 472 (3d Cir. 1987) ("To apply the Eighth
Amendment standard to mentally retarded persons would be little short of barbarous.").
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